a) China has undertaken a number of initiatives since 2002 that have contributed positively to its understanding of ML/TF risk, although some important gaps remain. Its framework for domestic AML/CFT co-operation and co-ordination is well established.

自2002年以来，中国采取了一系列举措，尽管还存在一些重要差距，但这些举措对于增进理解洗钱/恐怖融资（ML/TF）风险起到了积极作用。其国内AML/CFT合作与协调框架已日臻成熟。

b) China’s de-centralised FIU arrangement consisting of CAMLMAC, AMLB and 36 PBC provincial branches has high potential to produce financial intelligence that supports the operational needs of competent authorities but its current functioning results in incomplete access by all parts of the FIU to all data, a fragmented analysis and disseminations, and limits the development of a holistic view. Therefore, major improvements are needed.

中国已经建立了非集中的金融情报机构（FIU）体系，其中包括中国反洗钱监测分析中心（CAMLMAC）、反洗钱局（AMLB）、以及遍布于全国的36个中国人民银行省级分行等，这个体系在处理金融情报方面有着很高的潜力，可以支持主管部门的操作需求，但当前的状态还不能满足FIU各个部门及时获取所有数据，分析和传播也是局部性的，这局限了全面性的分析和开发。因此，还需要进行重大改进。

c) LEAs have access to and use a wide range of financial intelligence throughout the lifetime of an investigation, but financial intelligence is not driving ML investigations. When using financial intelligence, LEAs identify predicate criminal behaviours and actively investigate these. Predicate crime investigation outcomes reflect that China has capable LEAs that are skilled in the investigation of complex financial crime and associated predicate crime. Effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions are available and are applied for ML.

执法机构（LEAs）在洗钱有关的调查中，可随时访问和使用广泛的金融情报，但金融情报并不能推动ML调查。在使用金融情报时，执法机构会识别上游犯罪行为并积极调查这些行为。上游犯罪侦查结果表明，中国具有较强的侦查复杂金融犯罪和关联上游犯罪的执法能力。中国已经对洗钱开展了有效的、相称的和有力的制裁。

d) China has an institutional framework in place to investigate and prosecute TF activities, in line with its understanding of TF risks and in line with its strategy to prevent TF and disrupt TF channels. Since the implementation of a new counterterrorism law in 2015 and related interpretations, the number of TF prosecutions and convictions has increased.

中国已建立了制度框架来调查和起诉涉恐融资活动，这与其对涉恐融资风险的理解、以及预防和阻断恐怖融资的战略相匹配。自2015年实施新的反恐法和相关解释以来，洗钱起诉和定罪数量有所增加。

 e) The implementation of TF and PF targeted financial sanctions is negatively affected by three fundamental deficiencies, related to

(i) scope of coverage of the requirements and a lack of a prohibition covering all persons and entities; (ii) the types of assets and funds of designated entities that can in practice be frozen, and the type of transactions that can be prohibited; and (iii) a lack of implementation without delay for non-domestic designations. That said, the CTL and relevant PBC Notice are a good starting point for future updates to the legal system in line with revised FATF standards, and to improve effective implementation. While not covered by the FATF standards, authorities have taken measures in relation to other aspects of UNSCRs related to DPRK.

针对TF（恐怖融资）和PF（扩散融资）而实施的金融制裁，受到三个基本缺陷的不利影响，具体包括：（i）法规要求的覆盖性方面存在问题，缺少覆盖全部个人和机构的禁令;（ii）可以冻结的特定实体的资产和资金类型方面，以及可以禁止的交易类型方面存在问题;（iii）不能及时执行来自国外的指令。也就是说，未来相关法律根据FATF标准更新时，使用PBC或CTL的通知渠道是比较好的选择，可以提升部署有效性。虽然FATF标准没有涵盖，但政府已经根据联合国安理会（UNSCRs）有关朝鲜问题（DPRK）的决议而采取了相关措施。

f) While FIs have a satisfactory understanding of their AML/CFT obligations, they have not developed a sufficient understanding of risks. Measures implemented to mitigate risk are generally not commensurate with different risk situations. 

虽然金融机构对其反洗钱/反恐融资的义务有了比较充分的理解，但他们对风险的理解还存在不足。所采取的风险缓释措施通常与所处的风险情况不相称。

g) China’s AML/CFT supervisory system is almost exclusively focused on the financial sector, as there are no effective preventive or supervisory measures in respect of the DNFBP sector. The PBC has an inadequate understanding of risks overall. Although their understanding of risk impacting the financial sector is adequate, its understanding of institution-specific risk seems to be largely based on the FIs’ own risk assessment rather than that of the authorities. 

中国的反洗钱/反恐怖融资的监管系统几乎集中在金融行业，对特定非金融行业（DNFBP）缺乏有效的预防或监督措施。人民银行对整体风险的认识不足。虽然他们对金融行业的洗钱风险理解是充分的，但对具体机构洗钱风险的理解，似乎主要基于金融机构自己的风险评估，缺乏监管层面的评估。

h) China handles MLA and extradition requests in accordance with the procedures and standards for approval stipulated by domestic laws, bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions, but due to a complicated decision-making structure for providing MLA or executing extradition requests, it is often a protracted process. At the same time, China can arrange an expedited procedure for urgent requests or cases. There is an effective cooperation in some areas between China and some of its neighbours, however, there is a lack of data that would establish effective implementation of ML/TF related co-operation.

中国按照本国法律，双边条约和多边公约规定的审批程序和标准处理司法协助和引渡请求，但由于决策流程复杂，往往需要漫长的过程。与此同时，中国可以为紧急请求或案件安排快速程序。中国与一些邻国之间在某些领域进行了有效的合作，但在建立有效实施ML / TF合作方面的数据仍然不足够。

a) China should expand the information sources relied upon to formulate its NRA to include broader qu of the ML/TF threats, vulnerabilities, and risks it faces, such as academic and international organizations’ publications on the subject as well as feedback from foreign jurisdictions. This will allow a more balanced understanding of the ML and TF risks faced by China beyond those directly linked to proceeds generating predicate offences.

中国应拓展信息来源，以构建国家风险评估体系（NRA），可藉由更广阔的视野去面对ML / TF威胁、脆弱性和风险，例如学术机构和国际组织的相关出版物，以及来自国外司法管辖区的反馈。这样可以更全面地理解中国面临的ML和TF风险，而不局限于与产生上游犯罪的收益直接有关的方面。

b) China should review the functioning of its FIU to ensure that all information received, analysed and disseminated by all three FIU components is readily available and accessible both at the central and provincial levels. This review should include the creation of a database to unify and centralise all components of the current (stand-alone) databases at central and provincial levels. In addition, to ensure the operational independence of the FIU, China should remove the signature of the president of the PBC provincial branch as a condition for dissemination of information to competent authorities.

中国应审查其金融情报机构（FIU）的运作情况，以确保所有三个组成部分所收集、分析和传播的信息，都可以在中央和省级随时可获取可使用。应考虑建立一个数据库来统一和集中管理那些当前散落于省级和国家级的各个数据库的数据。另外，为确保金融情报机构的运作独立性，中国应取消信息在各个成员机构之间分发时必须经过人行省级分支机构负责人签署的要求。

c) Reconsideration of the policy, which focuses on pursuit of those involved in predicate crime to combat ML, to include a broader focus to “follow the money” beyond those who are active participants in the predicate crime.

应考虑更新管理策略，当前重点在于追溯那些参与了上游犯罪，从而打击ML；应该扩展视野，将重点放在“监测资金流向”，不局限于那些上游犯罪的主动参与者。

d) Authorities should create comprehensive legal frameworks for the implementation of TF- and PF-related TFS that includes a general prohibition, extends to all assets of designated entities, and is implemented without delay, with regard to designations by the UNSC. In the interim, the PBC should update its existing Notice to address delays in freezing. The exiting legal framework for TF and the contemplated law on PF could be instrumental in this regard.

政府应当建立全面的法律框架，以实施对TF和PF相关的定向金融制裁（TFS），其中包括一般性禁止、扩展到特定机构的所有资产，并应无时滞地执行联合国安理会（UNSC）的决议。在进程中，中国人民银行（PBC）应更新其已有的通知，以解决冻结延迟问题。现有的TF法律框架和关于PF的预期法律应该在这方面发挥作用。

e) Shortcomings in the AML/CFT legal framework related to the coverage of online lending institutions, DNFBPs, domestic PEPs, TFS, and the criteria for reporting suspicious transactions should be addressed. Corresponding guidance should be provided as needed.

反洗钱/反恐怖融资法律框架中的以下方面存在的缺陷应予以解决：应涵盖网络贷款机构、特定非金融机构（DNFBP）、国内政要（PEP）、定向金融制裁（TFS）和可疑交易报告标准等。应根据需要提供相应的指导。

f) China’s attention should focus on: (i) the robustness and usefulness of risk assessments of FIs, to ensure that these reflect actual threats and corresponding vulnerabilities exposing these institutions to risk; (ii) the effectiveness of ongoing due diligence, notably the monitoring of transactions; and (iii) the consolidated supervision of financial groups, to ensure a robust management of ML/TF risks by these groups.

中国应重点考虑：（i）提升金融机构风险评估的稳健性和实用性，以确保能够反映出这些机构风险暴露所面临的实际威胁和相应的脆弱性;（ii）提升所施行尽职调查的有效性，特别是交易监控;（iii）考虑对金融集团进行综合监管，以确保这些集团对ML / TF风险进行稳健管理。

g) The PBC should introduce an effective system of assessing individual entities' risks and supervising and monitoring DNFBPs (apart from trust companies and DPMs) for compliance with AML/CFT obligations. In doing so, China should review the strategy and necessity of collaborating with sector supervisors in the DNFBP sectors, given their low level of knowledge about ML/TF risks.

中国人民银行（PBC）应采用有效的系统，去评估各个机构的风险，督导并监控特定非金融机构（DNFBP）（除信托公司和DPM之外）对于AML / CFT义务的合规性。在此过程中，应从战略层面考虑与这些特定非金融机构的行业监管部门合作，给他们进行ML/TF风险的基础知识普及。

h) Authorities should ensure that competent authorities can obtain adequate, accurate and current basic and BO information (beyond legal owner information), in a timely manner. This will require measures that ensure that such information is accurately registered or kept somewhere that is accessible.

政府应确保各个被授权机构能够及时获得充分、准确和最新的基本信息和受益所有人（BO）信息（不应局限于法定所有者信息）。这需要采取措施确保此类信息准确注册，以及保存在可访问的地方。

i) China should pay more attention to the exchange of information in ML/TF cases and increase the number of spontaneous requests sent to foreign counterparts, as a result of its strategic and operational analysis and should, in general, reduce the time taken to respond to foreign requests.

中国应该更多地关注反洗钱/反恐怖融资案件中的信息交流，应经过战略和操作层面的分析后，增加主动请求国外同行信息的数量，总体上，应减少对外方请求的回应时间。